Phan Minh Triet

DTC Strategy — Gaming Industry

Applied AI & LLMs

LiveOps & Player Growth

Head of SEA @ Aghanim

SEA Business Development

Blog Post

What Is Direct-to-Consumer for Game Studios?

Direct-to-consumer for game studios means selling digital goods through a studio-owned channel — bypassing the 30% fee charged by platforms like the App Store, Google Play, and Steam. Instead of retaining 70 cents on every dollar spent, studios retain 95 cents or more. The constraint is not the economics; it is the operational infrastructure required to make the channel work at scale.

Every time a player buys a skin through the App Store or Google Play, the studio that made the game receives 70 cents on the dollar. The platform keeps 30. On Steam, the split is similar. For a studio generating $100 million in annual in-app purchase revenue, this represents $30 million that never reaches the business — not from underperformance, but from the default fee structure of platform distribution.

Direct-to-consumer is the model that changes this equation. It is not a marketing campaign or a new storefront. It is a structural shift in how a game studio captures the value it creates — and a capability that most studios underestimate the difficulty of building.

What Direct-to-Consumer Means for Game Studios

Direct-to-consumer for game studios means selling digital goods — in-game currency, virtual items, battle passes, downloadable content — through a channel owned and operated by the studio, without routing the transaction through a third-party platform and its associated revenue share.

This is different from what “direct-to-consumer” means in physical retail, where a brand ships a product directly to a customer’s door. In gaming, the product is virtual — a currency balance, a skin, an unlock — and it must be delivered inside a game that players already access through a platform. A player who downloads a game on iOS already has an Apple ID, stored payment credentials, and years of platform-level trust. Moving that player’s transactions through a separate studio-owned channel requires offering something that makes the friction worth it.

The Economics: Why the Fee Gap Matters

Platform marketplaces charge a standard 30% revenue share on digital transactions. Apple’s App Store and Google Play both apply this rate (reduced to 15% for developers earning under $1M annually through their respective small business programs, introduced in 2020–2021). Steam charges 30% on the first $10M in annual revenue, 25% on the next $40M, and 20% above $50M. A studio-owned channel replaces this with payment processing fees of approximately 2.9–5%, depending on provider, payment method, and geography.

Per $1.00 spent
Via Platform
App Store · Google Play · Steam
Studio
30%
$0.70 reaches
the studio
30% 25% 20% Steam tiers
Per $1.00 spent
Via Direct Channel
Studio-owned web store
Studio
$0.95+ reaches
the studio
~5% PSP processing only

Platform: Apple/Google 30%; Small Business Program 15% applies to studios under $1M annual revenue (excluded above). Steam: 30% on first $10M → 25% on next $40M → 20% above $50M.

Revenue split per $1.00 spent — platform distribution vs. studio-owned direct channel

The gap compounds at scale. A studio generating $50M in annual in-app purchases through platform channels retains approximately $35M after fees. The same revenue through a direct channel retains $47.5M — a $12.5M margin difference before accounting for the cost of building and operating the channel itself. Sensor Tower data puts global mobile gaming revenue at approximately $90 billion annually as of 2024. Even a modest shift toward direct channels across the industry represents significant aggregate margin improvement — which is why platforms have strongly resisted it.

Why Gaming Direct-to-Consumer Is Structurally Different

The economic case is clear. The operational case is harder. Direct-to-consumer in gaming faces three structural constraints that do not exist in physical consumer goods:

1
Platform Lock-in
Players cannot take game progress, friends lists, or purchase history off the platform where they play. The game exists inside a closed ecosystem the studio does not control.
2
Regulatory Friction
Apple’s App Store rules historically prohibited studios from directing players to external purchase flows inside iOS apps. A 2021 court ruling required Apple to allow informing users of external options — but did not change the fee structure for in-app transactions. The regulatory boundary remains contested.
3
No Built-in Discovery
A direct channel has no organic traffic. Every player who transacts through it must be driven there from inside the game or from marketing — at a cost the studio must account for in the economics.

The most visible test of these constraints came in August 2020, when Epic Games added a direct payment option to Fortnite to bypass Apple’s 30% fee. Apple removed Fortnite from the App Store the same day. The resulting legal battle reached the US Supreme Court and ultimately resulted in a narrow ruling: Apple must allow apps to link to external purchase options, but is not required to permit in-app transactions outside its payment system. Epic’s Fortnite remains absent from iOS today. The structural tension between platform economics and studio Direct-to-consumer is unresolved.

Platform Distribution

Revenue share: 30% to platform (tiered for volume)

Player data: Platform-owned; studio receives aggregated attribution

Payment methods: Platform’s (card, Apple Pay, Google Pay)

Pricing control: Subject to platform review and currency conversion

Discovery: Platform algorithm and store placement

Regulatory risk: Platform policy changes

Direct-to-Consumer

Revenue share: 3–5% payment processing only

Player data: Studio-owned; full purchase and behavioral data

Payment methods: Flexible — local methods, vouchers, crypto

Pricing control: Studio sets pricing, runs experiments directly

Discovery: Studio drives traffic from in-game and marketing

Regulatory risk: Payment compliance, data privacy

What a Direct-to-Consumer Capability Actually Requires

Direct-to-consumer is not a storefront. It is an operational infrastructure. Studios that treat it as a distribution add-on — a web shop bolted onto an existing game — consistently find that the channel fails to reach its economic potential. Four capabilities must exist before the channel can work at scale:

1
Payment Infrastructure
The ability to process credit cards, local payment methods, and chargebacks at scale — without platform intermediation. This includes fraud detection, currency localization, and tax compliance across multiple jurisdictions.
2
Cross-Platform Identity
A player account system that exists independently of any single platform, linking purchase history and entitlements across devices and storefronts. Without this, a player who buys currency on a web shop cannot receive it in a mobile game.
3
Fulfillment Layer
Reliable delivery of virtual goods to the correct player account within the game, regardless of where the purchase originated. Failed or delayed fulfillment is the most common reason players abandon direct channels after a first purchase.
4
Incrementality Measurement
The ability to measure whether direct channel revenue is genuinely new, or simply shifted from platform purchases. Without this, a studio cannot know whether the channel is generating margin improvement or just moving transactions between buckets.
Most studios that attempt Direct-to-consumer without all four foundations find the channel generates revenue but creates operational problems that offset the margin gains. The infrastructure is the business case — not the storefront.

The Direct-to-Consumer Series: Eight Articles

The following eight articles examine each constraint and decision point in detail — from how to assess whether your studio is operationally ready, to how to measure whether the channel is actually working.

Direct-to-consumer for game studios is not a distribution strategy — it is a capability build. The economics are compelling; the infrastructure required to realize them is not trivial. Most studios that fail at Direct-to-consumer do not fail because the economics are wrong. They fail because they launched the channel before the capability existed to sustain it.
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